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DEFINING REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE
UNDER SECTION 548(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE:
IS RISTICH THE ANSWER?
Section 548(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code' authorizes trustees
2
of bankrupt estates to avoid fraudulent transfers of debtors' interests in
1. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In 1970 Congress formed the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to recommend revisions to the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898. See Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (establishing special
commission); see also Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 67e, 30 Stat. 544, 564-65, amended
by Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 67d, 52 Stat. 840, 877, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2600 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §
548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Congress originally designed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 to
address business bankruptcies. H.R. RP. No. 927, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & AmiNm. NEws 3559, 3560. The Commission, however, found that since
1950 the number of consumer bankruptcies had increased by 1000 percent and recognized that
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 failed to cope adequately with modem-day consumer bankruptcy
proceedings. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmN. NEws 5963, 5966. Based on the results of the Commission's study, Congress
modernized federal bankruptcy law by enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
Although the Bankruptcy Reform Act contains fraudulent transfer provisions, the foun-
dation for American fraudulent conveyance law is the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, which the
English Parliament enacted in 1570. Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 1570, 13 Eliz., ch.
5., quoted in G. GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAuDuILENT CONVEYANCES § 53 (1931). Before Parliament
enacted the Statute, debtors would transfer property solely to place legal title of the property
beyond the reaches of creditors. F. Wart, A TREATISE ON FRAuDUTLENT CONVEYANCES AND
CREDITORS' BILLs § 19 (2d ed. 1889). To allow a creditor to avoid fraudulent transfers that
debtors made specifically to defraud creditors of their lawful debts, Parliament enacted the
Statute. Id.; D. MOORE, A TREATISE ON FRAuDU[.ENT CONVEYANCES AND CREDITORS' REMEDIES
§ 8, at 11-12 (1908).
When the statutory law of bankruptcy began to develop in the United States, the Statute
was a model for the fraudulent conveyance provisions. Zinman, Houle & Weiss, Fraudulent
Transfers According to Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAW.
977, 989 (1984)[hereinafter Zinman]. Adopting the features and language of the Statute of 13
Elizabeth, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §
67e, 30 Stat. 544, 564-65, amended by Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 67d, 52 Stat. 840,
877, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2600
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). The Bankruptcy Act of
1898 contained provisions covering both intentional and implied fraudulent conveyances. Id.
In 1918 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws codified a
relaxed version of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA). Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 7A U.L.A. 427-638 (1985). Section 7 of the UFCA
invalidates voluntary and intentional transfers made by debtors that interfere with the rights
of creditors. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1985); see 11 U.S.C. §
548(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (containing intentional fraudulent transfer provision). Section
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property occurring before debtors file petitions in bankruptcy.3 Empowered
4 of the UFCA, however, authorizes creditors to avoid constructive fraudulent conveyances
without proving the debtor's fraudulent intent. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 4, 7A
U.L.A. 474 (1985); see 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(containing constructive
fraudulent transfer provision). In enacting the constructive fraudulent transfer provision of
the UFCA, the Commissioners intended to eliminate the legal presumption concerning the
debtor's fraudulent intent. See Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Commissioners' Prefatory
Note, 7A U.L.A. 428 (1985)(noting that, before UFCA, courts unreasonably had presumed
debtor's fraudulent intent for transfers that harmed creditors even though creditors offered no
proof of debtor's actual intent to defraud creditors). Using the modified fraudulent conveyance
provisions of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth found in section 4 of the UFCA, Congress amended
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 with the Chandler Act of 1938 (Chandler Act). Act of June 22,
1938, ch. 575, § 67d, 52 Stat. 840, 877, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2600 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp.
111 1985)). Although incorporating the substance and essential elements of the fraudulent
conveyance sections of the UFCA, Congress also required that transfers, to be avoidable, had
to occur within one year before debtors filed their petitions in bankruptcy. Compare Act of
June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 67d, 52 Stat. 840, 877 (containing one year time limit), repealed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2600 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) with Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 4,
7A U.L.A. 474 (1985)(not containing one year time limit). In addition to adding the one year
time limit, Congress replaced the term "conveyance" in section 67(d) with the term "transfer"
and also required the parties to the transfer to act in good faith. Act of June 22, 1938, ch.
575, § 67d(2), 52 Stat. 840, 877, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2600 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985));
see Note, Regularly Conducted Non-Collusive Mortgage Foreclosure Sales: Inapplicability of
Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 52 FosRHm L. REv. 261, 267-68 (1983)(noting
that change in language may indicate that Congress intended to broaden application of §
67(d)(2)).
Congress enacted section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 to replace section 67(d)
of the Chandler Act. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549,
2600 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Congress intended
to incorporate the substance of section 67(d) of the Chandler Act into section 548, the
fraudulent transfer provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Report of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 20 (1973).
In enacting section 548, however, Congress omitted the good faith requirement contained in
section 67(d) of the Act because courts inconsistently applied the good faith standard to parties
making transfers. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2600
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); see Act of June 22, 1938,
ch. 575, § 67d(1)(e), 52 Stat. 840, 877, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2600 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III
1985))(trier of fact could find that debtor received fair consideration in § 67(d) only if parties
to transfer acted in good faith). In section 548 Congress also replaced the term "fair
consideration" with the term "reasonably equivalent value." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2600 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(1982
& Supp. III 1985)).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1982). Section 323 of the Bankruptcy Code defines the term
"trustee" as the representative of the debtor's estate in a bankruptcy action. Id. Trustees are
both officers of the court and representatives of the debtor's creditors. In re Benny, 29 Bankr.
754, 760 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1983). Generally, the duties of trustees include uncovering all
property comprising the estate, protecting the property of the estate, defending the legal rights
and interests of the estate, and preserving the value of the estate's property. L. KING, COLLIER
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to avoid fraudulent transfers, trustees may protect creditors' interests in the
bankruptcy estates. 4 Under section 548(a) the trustee must prove, first, that
HANDBOOK FOR TRusmEEs AND DEBTORS IN POSSESSION § 4.03 (1985).
The specific duties of trustees, however, vary according to whether debtors file bankruptcy
petitions for liquidation, business reorganization, or debt adjustment. In Chapter 7 liquidation
proceedings, trustees must liquidate the property of the estate, maximize the size of the estate,
and secure the largest possible distribution to creditors at the earliest possible time. Id. To
accomplish their goals, Chapter 7 trustees collect and convert the property of the debtor's
estate, account for all the property of the estate, investigate the financial affairs of the debtor,
and file reports and summaries of the debtor's business with the court. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp.
III 1985). In Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings, however, trustees take possession of the
estate's property, maintain all legal actions of the estate, operate the debtor's business, submit
to the court a reorganization plan and a disclosure statement, obtain court confirmation of
the plan, and implement the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see L. KING,
supra, § 7.01 (listing duties of Chapter 11 trustee). Debtors, however, may retain title to
the assets of the estate under a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982
and Supp. III 1985). If the bankrupt debtor retains title to his assets, the debtor, as debtor-
in-possession, "stands in the shoes of the trustee" and performs the functions of a trustee.
Herman Cantor Corp. v. Cattle King Packing Co., 22 Bankr. 604, 606 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1982). In Chapter 13 debt adjustment proceedings, trustees neither take possession of the
estate's property nor operate the debtor's business. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1302(b)(1), 1303, 1304 (1982
& Supp. III 1985). Instead, Chapter 13 trustees work closely with the debtor to investigate the
financial affairs of the estate, to examine and object to creditors' claims, to account for
property received by the estate, and to oppose discharge of the estate's debts. L. KING, supra,
§ 8.01.
3. 11 US.C. § 548(a) (1982 and Supp. III 1985). Debtors fraudulently transfer property
when they either convey a property interest intentionally to harm creditors' interests or harm
creditors' interests by accepting less than a reasonably equivalent value for the property interest.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The avoidance of a debtor's transfer as a
fraudulent conveyance is not self-executing, but, rather, requires the trustee or debtor-in-
possession to recover the property interest for the creditors' benefit by instigating a judicial
action in a bankruptcy court. Bartd v. Garfinkel (In re Claxton), 30 Bankr. 199, 204 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1983).
4. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. Naws 5787, 5791. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
which recommended changes to the Chandler Act of 1938, recognized that Congress, by
enacting federal bankrutpcy laws, intended to provide debtors with relief from debt and to
protect the interests of the debtors' creditors. See REPORT OF THE COMIISSION ON THE
BANKRUPCTY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I,
at 71 (1973)(Congress' intent was to give debtors fresh start and protect position of creditors
in open credit economy). In codifying the rights of creditors in the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Congress intended to protect secured creditors. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ArnsiN. NEWs 5963, 5966. To benefit creditors,
Congress enabled trustees to include as property of bankruptcy estates any property of value
that debtors have and to dispose of bankruptcy estates' property in a manner that would
maximize the benefit to the creditors. H. REP. No. 595, supra, at 6136-37. To allow trustees
to include all of debtors' property in bankruptcy estates and, thus, to retain greater amounts
of equity in bankruptcy estates for the creditors' benefit, Congress in section 548 authorized
trustees to recover more easily property fraudulently transferred by debtors. S. REP. No. 989,
supra. In section 548, Congress recognized that debtors could intentionally defraud creditors
or jeopardize creditors' interests in bankruptcy estates by disposing of property for less than
a reasonably equivalent value. See id. at 5875 (containing both intentional fraudulent transfer
provision and constructive fraudulent transfer provision).
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the debtor transferred his property within one year before he filed his
bankruptcy petition.5 Second, the trustee must prove that in transferring his
property the debtor intentionally defrauded creditors6 or the debtor harmed
the creditors' interests by accepting less than a reasonably equivalent value
for the property transferred.7 The Bankruptcy Code's definition of the term
"transfer" includes foreclosure sales. In applying section 548(a) to foreclo-
5. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). According to section 548(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code, a transfer occurs when the transferee perfects the transfer so that a bona
fide purchaser could not acquire an interest in the property superior to the interest of the
transferee. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985). In the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Congress amended the definition of the term "transfer" to include
the foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §421(j)(1), 98 Stat. 333, 368 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 101(48) (Supp. III 1985). Nevertheless, courts have differed over what constitutes
perfection in the context of foreclosure sales. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621
F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980)(time of transfer for purposes of Bankruptcy Code is foreclosure
sale itself); Strauser v. Veterans Admin. (In re Strauser), 40 Bankr. 868, 871 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1984) (transfer occurs when parties have perfected creditors' security interest so that
bona fide purchaser from debtor could not acquire superior title to property); Alsop v. Alaska
(In re Alsop), 14 Bankr. 982, 968 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981)(applying Alaska law, court held
that time of transfer related back to when party so far perfected title that any subsequent
purchaser from debtor could not acquire good title), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
Many courts now recognize, however, that a transfer under section 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code occurs at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Christian v. Ryan (In re Christian), 48
Bankr. 833, 835-36 (D. Colo. 1985)(time of transfer is foreclosure sale because debtor can
have multiple interests in property and individual interests conveyed through multiple transfers);
New Yorketown Assocs. v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc. (In re New Yorketown
Assocs.), 40 Bankr. 701, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)(same); Lakeview Inv. Group, Inc. v.
Pemberton (In re Lakeview Inv. Group, Inc.), 40 Bankr. 449, 452 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984)(same).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). The Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee to
avoid a transfer if the debtor conveyed his property interest with the actual intent of hindering,
delaying, or defrauding creditors. Id. The trustee need not produce direct evidence of the
actual, subjective intent of the debtor. Wilson v. Upreach Ministries (In re Missionary Baptist
Found. of Am., Inc.), 24 Bankr. 973, 976 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). The trustee only must
prove facts that compel the conclusion that the debtor actually intended to defraud creditors.
See Bartl v. Garfinkel (In re Claxton), 30 Bankr. 199, 213 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983)(holding
that debtor who created network of relatives and friends to receive property intentionally
defrauded creditors by transferring property out of reach of creditors).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Bankruptcy Code authorizes
trustees to avoid transfers by debtors as constructively fraudulent conveyances if the debtor
"received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation."
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985). In addition to proving that the debtor received less
than a reasonably equivalent value for the property interest, the trustee must establish that
the debtor was insolvent when the transfer occurred or became insolvent because of the
transfer, undercapitalized his business, or was unable to pay maturing debts. 11 U.S.C. §
548(a)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Thus, Congress recognized in the fraudulent conveyance
provision of the Bankruptcy Code that a debtor can jeopardize creditors' rights unintentionally
by disposing of property for less than reasonably equivalent value. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 5787, 5875
(containing both intentional fraudulent transfer provision and constructive fraudulent transfer
provision).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (Supp. III 1985). In section 101(48) of the Bankruptcy Code
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sure sales, 9 federal courts have disagreed on the meaning of the term
"reasonably equivalent value" and, accordingly, have developed four dif-
ferent standards for determining reasonable equivalence.' 0
Congress defined the term "transfer," in pertinent part, as "every mode ... of disposing of
or parting with property or with an interest in property, including . . . foreclosure of the
debtor's equity of redemption." Id.
9. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980)(changing
bankruptcy law in context of fraudulent conveyances by permitting trustee to avoid foreclosure
sale). The Durrett decision marks the first time that a court in a bankruptcy proceeding used
the fraudulent conveyance concept to avoid a valid, regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclo-
sure sale. G. NELSON & D. Wmu.Nt , REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 8.16(1)(a) (2d ed. 1985).
A mortgage foreclosure sale ends the debtor's equity of redemption. Id. § 7.5. A
debtor's equity of redemption is a debtor's right after default to perform his obligation under
the mortgage and to recover clear title to the property. Id. § 7.1. To be valid, however,
the foreclosure sales must conform to the standards established by state statute. Id. § 7.16.
Generally, state statutes provide that notice to all creditors must precede the foreclosure sale
and that a sheriff or officer of the court must direct the foreclosure sale. Id.
In addition to regulating the conduct at the foreclosure sale, state statutes govern the
type of foreclosure which the mortgagee-creditor may seek. Id. A judicial foreclosure in equity
is the most common method of foreclosure. Id. Judicial foreclosure, although available in
every state and the predominant method of foreclosure in half of the states, is also the most
complex and lengthy foreclosure process. Id. A judicial foreclosure in equity includes a
preliminary title search, a filing of a foreclosure complaint, service of process, a hearing, a
decree or judgment, a notice of sale, a sale and issuance of a certificate of sale, a report of
sale, a determination of right of surplus, possible redemptions, and an entry of decree for
deficiency. Id.
The second most common method of foreclosure is the power of sale. Id. § 7.19. The
deed of trust is the most common mortgage instrument containing the power of sale. Id. In
the deed of trust, the debtor conveys the property to a trustee who holds legal title to the
property in trust for the benefit of the debtor until the debtor has paid his debt in full. Id.
If the debtor defaults on his payments, the trustee exercises his power of sale by holding a
public sale of the property. Id. The power of sale requirements are much less stringent than
the requirements of judicial foreclosure. Id. Unlike the judicial foreclosure, the power of sale
foreclosure generally does not require a hearing, and notice simply may be notice of default. Id.
10. Compare Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir.
1980)(proposing 70% of fair market value standard), Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc.
v. Equitable Trust Co. (In re Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 36, 39
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982)(debtor receives less than reasonably equivalent value when purchase
price is 57.7% of fair market value of property), Carr v. DeMusis (In re Carr), 34 Bankr.
653, 656-57 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983)(purchase price of 31% of fair market value of property
does not constitute reasonably equivalent value), aff'd, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984), and
Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1982)(purchase price of less than 70% of fair market value of property does not constitute
reasonably equivalent value); with Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21
Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)(proposing bankruptcy standard of avoiding transfers
under state foreclosure law that mere inadequacy of price, without fraud, oppression, or
unfairness, will not justify setting aside foreclosure sale), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139 (6th Cir.
1985) (adopting Madrid court standard that mere inadequacy of price is insufficent to jus-
tify avoiding foreclosure sale), Strauser v. Veterans Admin. (In re Strauser), 40 .Bankr. 868,
869-70 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)(adopting conclusive presumption of reasonable equivalence
at regularly conducted foreclosure sale), and William v. Travelers Ins. Co. (In re William), 39
19871
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In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co." the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit defined reasonably equivalent value
for purposes of foreclosure sales as an amount that equalled or exceeded
seventy percent of the fair market value of the debtor's property interest.' 2
In Durrett a third party purchaser bought the debtor's property interest at
a nonjudicial foreclosure sale for 57.7 percent of the fair market value of
the property. 3 Nine days after the foreclosure sale the debtor, Durrett, filed
a petition in bankruptcy. 14 Subsequently, Durrett, as plaintiff debtor-in-
possession, petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas to avoid the foreclosure sale under section 67(d) of the
Chandler Act of 1938.1- Concluding that the foreclosure sale purchase price
was a fair equivalent of the property interest, the district court refused to
avoid the foreclosure sale. Durrett appealed to the Fifth Circuit.16 On appeal
the Fifth Circuit in Durrett noted that it could not find a court approving
a transfer for less than seventy percent of the fair market value of the
property. 7 The Fifth Circuit held that, accordingly, the foreclosure sale of
the debtor's interest constituted a fraudulent conveyance under section 67(d)
of the Chandler Act. 8 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit in Durrett reversed the
Bankr. 678, 680 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984)(inadequacy of price insufficient grounds for challenging
regularly conducted foreclosure sale); with First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismarck v. Hulm
(In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir.)(requiring case-by-case analysis of facts and
circumstances of each transfer), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say.
Bank (In re Ruebeck), 585 Bankr. 163, 168 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985)(avoiding foreclosure sale
by determining reasonable equivalence on case-by-case approach), Adwar v. Capgro Leasing
Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 115 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)(court must determine
reasonable equivalence through factual analysis on case-by-case basis), and Lower Downtown
Assocs. v. Brazosbanc Sav. Ass'n of Texas (In re Lower Downton Assocs.), 52 Bankr. 662,
666 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985)(reasonable equivalence depends on many factors, not formula);
with In re Ristich, 57 Bankr. 568, 577 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986)(distinguishing between types of
foreclosure sale purchasers before deciding on standard to apply to determine reasonably
equivalent value).
11. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
12. Id. at 203.
13. Id. The trial court in Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co. found that the
fair market value of the property was 200,000.00 dollars. Id. The trial court also found that
by buying the property for 115,400.00 dollars at the foreclosure sale, the purchaser deprived
the bankrupt's estate of 84,600.00 dollars in equity. Id.
14. Id. at 202. In Durrett the trustee under the debtor's deed of trust exercised his power
to foreclose on the debtor's property and conducted a foreclosure sale on January 4, 1977.
Id. at 202-203. On January 13, 1977, the debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 202 n.1.
15. Id.; see supra note 1 (section 548 of Bankruptcy Code replaced § 67(d) of Chandler
Act).
16. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 202 (5th Cir. 1980). In Durrett
the district court concluded that the nonjudicial foreclosure sale constituted a transfer within
the meaning of section 67(d) of the Chandler Act. Id. The district court held that, nonetheless,
the foreclosure sale purchase price was a fair consideration. Id.
17. Id. at 203.
18. Id. at 204. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Durrett
found that the foreclosure sale purchase price was not a fair equivalent for the property
conveyed. Id.
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district court's decision and ordered the district court to avoid the transfer
under section 67(d) of the Chandler Act. 19
Declining to adopt the seventy percent standard suggested by the Fifth
Circuit in Durrett, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the
Ninth Circuit in Lawyers Title Insurance Co. v. Madrid (In re Madrid)
20
equated reasonably equivalent value in section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code with the forum state's foreclosure law standard for reasonable equiv-
alence.21 In Madrid a third party purchaser at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale
paid 80,224.00 dollars for the debtor's property, which had a fair market
value of approximately 380,000.00 dollars at the time of the sale. 2 Within
a week after the foreclosure sale, Madrid, as debtor, filed a petition in
bankruptcy and, as plaintiff debtor-in-possession, successfully urged the
United States Bankruptcy Court of the Ninth Circuit to avoid the foreclosure
sale as a fraudulent conveyance under section 548(a).23 Subsequently, the
third party purchaser appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.2 4 On
appeal the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Madrid applied the law of Nevada,
the forum state, to determine reasonably equivalent value at the foreclosure
sale." The Madrid court noted that under Nevada foreclosure law mere
19. Id. The Fifth Circuit in Durrett remanded the case and directed a rescission of the
foreclosure sale under section 67(d) of the Chandler Act in a manner that would protect the
foreclosure sale purchaser's equity in the property. Id.
20. 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
21. Id. at 427. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Lawyers Title Insurance Co. v.
Madrid (In re Madrid) questioned whether the standard used in Durrett should apply to
regularly conducted public foreclosure sales. Id. at 426. Noting that state foreclosure law
should be in harmony with fraudulent conveyance law, the Madrid court construed the
reasonably equivalent value standard in section 548(a) to mean that the consideration received
at a noncollusive and regularly conducted foreclosure sale was a reasonably equivalent value.
Id. at 427.
22. Id. at 425. In Madrid the defendant, debtor Madrid, purchased property for 290,000.00
dollars. Id. Madrid gave the seller 125,000.00 dollars in cash and executed a note secured by
a deed of trust for 165,000.00 dollars. Id. Madrid raised the cash for the purchase with
another note for 142,500.00 dollars secured by a second deed of trust. Id. When debtor Madrid
defaulted on her payments on the second note, the trustee under the deed of trust conducted
a foreclosure sale. Id. At the foreclosure sale, Madrid owed 175,000.00 dollars on the first
deed of trust and 80,224.00 dollars on the second deed of trust. Id. The fair market value of
the property was approximately 380,000.00 dollars. See id.(noting that Madrid's total indebt-
edness and also third party purchaser's bid were approximately 67% of fair market value of
property). The foreclosure sale purchaser bought the property for 80,224.00 dollars subject to
the first deed of trust for 175,000.00 dollars. Id.
23. Id. In Madrid the debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code on January 16, 1981. Id. Debtor Madrid argued that the court should avoid
the foreclosure sale because the sale did not comply with Nevada lav and the sale constituted
a fraudulent conveyance under section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. The trial court
found that the foreclosure sale satisfied Nevada foreclosure law but that the foreclosure sale
constituted a fraudulent conveyance. Id. Relying on the Durrett court's seventy percent
standard, the bankruptcy court rescinded the foreclosure sale because the foreclosure sale
purchase price was approximately sixty-seven percent of the property's fair market value. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 427. In Madrid the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel rejected the Durrett standard
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inadequacy of price is not sufficient justification to avoid a foreclosure
sale. 26 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Madrid held that, accordingly,
under Nevada law the consideration received at the foreclosure sale satisfied
the reasonably equivalent value requirement of section 548(a) because the
foreclosure sale was noncollusive and regularly conducted.27 Thus, the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Madrid reversed the bankruptcy court's
judgment that avoided the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent conveyance.
28
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in First
Federal Savings & Loan Association of Bismarck v. Hulm (In re Hulm)
29
disagreed with the Madrid court's state foreclosure law standard for deter-
mining reasonable equivalence at foreclosure sales and disregarded the
Durrett court's seventy percent standard. 0 Instead, the Eighth Circuit di-
rected the bankruptcy court to determine reasonably equivalent value at
foreclosure sales by conducting evidentiary hearings on the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding each foreclosure sale." In Hulm mortgagee First
Federal purchased the debtor's property interest at a foreclosure sale.
32
Seventeen days after the foreclosure sale debtor Hulm filed a petition in
bankruptcy. 33 First Federal, as plaintiff-foreclosure sale purchaser, petitioned
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of North Dakota to
exclude the foreclosed property from the bankrupt debtor's estate.3 Debtor
Hulm unsuccessfully defended by claiming that the foreclosed property was
part of the bankruptcy estate. 5 Reversing the bankruptcy court's use of the
Madrid standard, the United States District Court for the District of North
because the Fifth Circuit in Durrett relied on only one case to support its holding, and the
one case on which the Durrett court relied involved a voluntary, private transfer of realty. Id.
at 426. The transfer in Madrid, however, was a regularly conducted foreclosure sale. Id.
26. See id. at 427 (citing Golden v. Tomiyasu, 79 Nev. 503, 387 P.2d 989 (1963) and
Oiler v. Sonoma County Land Title Co., 137 Cal. App. 2d 633, 290 P.2d 880 (1955)). The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Madrid noted that under Nevada law mere inadequacy of price,
unaccompanied by fraud, oppression, or unfairness, is not sufficient justification to set aside
a foreclosure sale. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. at 427. The
Madrid court reasoned that a regularly conducted foreclosure sale, open to all bidders and
creditors, would protect creditors from debtors' collusive transfers. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
30. Id. at 327.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 325. In First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Bismarck v. Hulm (In re
Hulm), debtor Hulm secured a note for 61,000.00 dollars with a mortgage from First Federal.
Id. When the debtor defaulted on his payment, the creditor mortgagee forclosed on the mortgage.
Id. At the foreclosure sale the creditor mortgagee purchased the debtor's property for 64,443.64
dollars. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. In Hulm First Federal sought a judicial determination that the foreclosed property
was not an asset of the bankruptcy estate. Id.
35. Id. Rejecting debtor Huhm's argument, the bankruptcy court in Hulm held that,
absent proof of fraud or collusion, the purchase price at a judicial foreclosure sale was, as a
matter of law, a reasonably equivalent value for the property conveyed. Id.
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Dakota concluded, -without conducting an evidentiary hearing, that the
foreclosure sale purchaser paid a reasonably equivalent value for the prop-
erty conveyed at a foreclosure sale.36 Defendant Hulm's trustee appealed
the district court's finding to the Eighth Circuit.3 7 On appeal the Eighth
Circuit rejected the lower courts' findings of reasonably equivalent value.38
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that a bankruptcy court cannot find automat-
ically that a debtor received reasonable equivalence at a regularly conducted
foreclosure sale.39 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit in Hulm ordered the
bankruptcy court to determine at an evidentiary hearing of the facts and
circumstances whether the foreclosure sale price was a reasonably equivalent
value for the property transferred.
40
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois
in In re Ristich4l declined to adopt the Durrett court's seventy percent
standard and the Hulm court's evidentiary hearing requirement. 42 Instead,
the Ristich court adopted a modified version of the state foreclosure law
standard suggested by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Madrid.4 3 In
Ristich creditor First National Bank of Schiller Park purchased debtor
Ristich's property at a foreclosure sale.44 The creditor never obtained legal
36. See id. at 325-26 (discussing district court's opinion).
37. Id. at 325. The district court in Hulm found that the foreclosure sale purchaser paid
a reasonably equivalent value for the property. Id. Neither the bankruptcy court, which applied
the state foreclosure law standard suggested in Madrid, nor the district court conducted an
evidentiary hearing to determine reasonable equivalence. Id. at 325-26.
38. Id. at 327.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 57 Bankr. 568 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
42. Id. at 577. The bankruptcy court in In re Ristich rejected the Durrett seventy percent
standard and the Hulm case-by-case standard because of the potential harm to the mortgage
market and to title stability. Id. The Ristich court expressed concern that the risk of trustees'
avoiding foreclosure sales would discourage potential third party purchasers from bidding at
foreclosure sales, that trustees of bankrupt debtors would avoid foreclosure sales long after
the statutory redemption period had expired, and that lenders would depress the real estate
market by being less willing to lend money. Id.
43. Id. at 577-78; Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424, 427
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). The Ristich court adopted a conclusive presumption of reasonable
equivalence at foreclosure sales, absent fraud or collusion, when the purchaser was an
independent third party. In re Ristich, 57 Bankr. 568, 577 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). The Ristich
court noted that the conclusive presumption protects both debtor and purchaser. Id. at 577-
78. The Ristich court adopted the Madrid state foreclosure law standard, however, when the
purchaser was the creditor. Id. at 578; Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21
Bank. at 427. The Ristich court noted that the Madrid standard protects debtors from
foreclosure sale irregularities. Ristich, 57 Bankr. at 578; Lawyers Title Ins. Co. v. Madrid (In
re Madrid), 21 Bank. at 427.
44. Ristich, 57 Bankr. at 570. In Ristich creditor First National Bank of Schiller Park
sought foreclosure of two of debtor Ristich's mortgages. Id. The Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, entered a judgment of foreclosure and scheduled a sheriff's sale of the
property on August 8, 1984. Id. On August 7, 1984, however, debtor Ristich filed a Chapter
13 bankruptcy petition that prevented the foreclosure sale. Id. After the bankruptcy court
dismissed Ristich's petition, the creditor purchased the property at the sheriff's sale. Id.
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title to the foreclosed property, however, because debtor Ristich filed a
petition in bankruptcy.45 To obtain legal title to the property, the creditor
urged the bankruptcy court to dismiss the debtor's bankruptcy petition.
4 6
In response, the bankrupt debtor Ristich contended that the foreclosure sale
constituted a fraudulent transfer and that, therefore, the property was part
of the bankruptcy estate.
4 7
In deciding the standard for determining reasonable equivalence, the
Ristich court distinguished between third party purchasers and creditor
purchasers . 4  The Ristich court held that if the purchaser is an independent
third party, a conclusive presumption of reasonable equivalence would exist,
absent a showing of fraud or collusion.49 The Ristich court held that if the
purchaser is the creditor, however, state foreclosure law would determine
reasonable equivalence as suggested by the Madrid court.5 0 Finding that the
foreclosure sale purchaser in Ristich was the creditor, the Ristich court
determined reasonable equivalence under state law.5' The Ristich court noted
that under Illinois law, the law of the forum state, proof of mistake,
accident, surprise, misconduct, or irregularity must accompany mere inad-
equacy of price to avoid a foreclosure sale.52 Finding that the bankrupt
debtor failed to prove lack of reasonable equivalence under the state law
standard, the Ristich court did not avoid the foreclosure sale to the creditor
purchaser.5 3 The Ristich court, rather, allowed the creditor to obtain legal
title to the property purchased at the foreclosure sale.
5 4
Although courts have developed four different standards for determining
reasonable equivalence at foreclosure sales, none of the standards is com-
pletely satisfactory. Although followed by many courts,5 the Durrett seventy
45. Id. In Ristich the debtor filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on April 15,
1985, two days before the statutory redemption period expired and two days before the sheriff
could issue the deed for the foreclosed property to the foreclosure sale purchaser. Id. The
petition prevented the sheriff from issuing the deed. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 577-78.
49. Id. at 577; see infra notes 111-116 and accompanying text (explaining how conclusive
presumption protects both debtors and foreclosure sale purchasers). In Ristich the bankruptcy
court conditioned the conclusive presumption on independent third party purchasers' providing
cash at the foreclosure sale and waiting for the statutory redemption period to expire. Ristich,
57 Bankr. at 577.
50. Ristich, 57 Bankr. at 578.
51. Id.
52. See id.(citing Block v. Hooper, 318 i11. 182, 185, 149 N.E. 21, 22 (1925)).
53. Ristich, 57 Bankr. at 578.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 Bankr. 818,
821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983)(debtor receives less than reasonably equivalent value when
foreclosure sale purchase price is below 70% of fair market value of property); Carr v.
DeMusis (In re Carr), 34 Bankr. 653, 656-57 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (foreclosure sale purchase
price of 31% of fair market value of property is less than reasonably equivalent value), aff'd,
40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984); Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21 Bankr.
832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982)(foreclosure sale purchase price that is less than 70% of
property's fair market value is not reasonably equivalent value).
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percent standard is unsatisfactory because courts applying the percentage
standard arbitrarily prevent trustees from maximizing the equity of bankrupt
debtors' estates. 6 The Durrett seventy percent standard also may be objec-
tionable as too rigid a formula.5 7 Moreover, courts applying the Durrett
standard do not recognize that the forced nature of the foreclosure market
and the different degrees of states' prebankruptcy protection lead to unjust
results and to lower foreclosure sale purchase prices. 8
The Durrett seventy percent standard is unsatisfactory because courts
apply the standard too rigidly. 9 Foreclosure sale purchase prices may be
only slightly greater than seventy percent of the fair market value of the
property. If so, based on a rigid percentage figure, courts would prevent
trustees from avoiding foreclosure sales as fraudulent transfers ° By not
permitting trustees to avoid foreclosure sales that yield only slightly more
than seventy percent of fair market value, the seventy percent standard
56. See Ruebeck V. Attleboro Sav. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 Bankr. 163, 167 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1985)(rigidity of Durrett standard prevents trustees from maximizing creditors'
interests in bankruptcy estate); Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111,
113 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)(Durrett standard fails to consider mitigating circumstances of
foreclosure sales and state's statutory redemption rights); White v. Luton (In re White), 47
Bankr. 98, 101 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985)(Durrett standard fails to produce desirable and reliable
results because of effect on mortgage lending); Davis & Standiford, Foreclosure Sale as
Fraudulent Transfer Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Reasonable Approach to Reasonably
Equivalent Value, 13 RAL EsT. L.J. 203, 225-27 (1985)(Durrett standard is harsh and fails to
consider nature of foreclosure sales); Note, supra note 1, at 278-80 (expressing concern over
detrimental effects of Durrett's de facto right of redemption on state foreclosure policies and
on real estate markets); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing Congress'
intent in enacting Bankruptcy Code and § 548 to maximize equity of bankruptcy estate for
creditor's benefit).
57. Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 Bankr. 163, 167 (Bankr. D
Mass. 1985); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr.
96th Cir. 1982); aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); see infra
notes 59-62 and accompanying text (examining how Durrett standard is too rigid).
58. See Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 113-14 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1985)(discussing problems of applying Durrett standard); Zinman, supra note 1, at
1004-07 (same); infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing problems arising from
nature of foreclosure sales and differences in prebankruptcy protections).
59. Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 Bankr. 163, 167-68 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1985).
60. See id.(expressing concern about "70% litmus test" proposed in Durrett). To apply
the Durrett standard, a court first determines the fair market value of the property. See
Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Ilhc. v. Equitable Trust Co. (In re Perdidio Bay Country
Club Estates, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 36, 40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982)(finding maximum fair market
value of property at $11.2 million). After determining the fair market value, a court determines
whether the purchase price at the foreclosure sale was seventy percent of the fair market value.
Id. If the foreclosure sale purchase price exceeds seventy percent of the fair market value of
the property, the court does not avoid the foreclosure sale. See id.(finding that purchase price
of $7.9 million was more than 700o fair market value of $11.2 million). If the foreclosure sale
purchase price is less than seventy percent of the property's fair market value, however, the
court avoids the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent conveyance. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l
Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980)(avoiding foreclosure sale because foreclosure sale
purchase price was only 57.707o of fair market value of property).
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reduces the realizable equity of the bankruptcy estate6 and undermines the
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code to protect the creditors' interests in the
bankruptcy estate.
62
Furthermore, the Durrett seventy percent standard is undesirable because
it fails to recognize the reality that debtors naturally receive lower purchase
prices at foreclosure sales than at retail sales. Courts applying the Durrett
standard use fair market value rather than foreclosure market value to
determine reasonable equivalence. 63 Yet, the benchmark for fair market
value is the retail market, and foreclosure sales, as forced sales, normally
yield purchase prices lower than retail purchase prices. 4 By applying the
seventy percent standard to the retail market price rather than to the
wholesale market price at foreclosure sales, courts unfairly determine whether
debtors receive less than a reasonably equivalent value for their property
interests. 65 Furthermore, property values vary substantially from one city to
another because the relative strengths of the foreclosure market and of the
retail market differ among cities.66 Thus, if applied to all potentially
61. Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal Property
Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C.L. REv. 257, 284 (1985)(to avoid foreclo-
sure sales under Durrett, trustees potentially lose 30% of property value from equity of
bankruptcy estate). The Durrett percentage standard is unfair because courts applying the
percentage standard automatically will avoid a foreclosure sale yielding only slightly less than
seventy percent of fair market value when, in fact, the bid price may have been the highest
possible price in the context of the foreclosure market. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid
(In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424, 425 (Bankr. 9th Cir.)(noting that bandruptcy court in applying
Durrett seventy percent standard avoided foreclosure sale yielding 67% of property's fair
market value), aff'd. 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984). Con-
versely, courts will not avoid foreclosure sales yielding slightly more than seventy percent
of fair market value when, in fact, the property has a much greater foreclosure market value.
If, hypothetically, the foreclosure sale in Madrid had yielded seventy-one percent of the
property's fair market value, a court applying the Durrett standard would not have avoided
the foreclsoure sale. Thus, a court would deny the trustee the opportunity to maximize the
potential equity for the benefit of the creditors although the foreclosure sale price only slightly
exceeded a percentage of fair market value.
62. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional intent for enacting
Bankruptcy Code and § 548 to maximize equity of bankruptcy estate for creditors' benefit).
63. See supra note 60 (explaining how courts apply Durrett seventy percent standard).
64. Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 113 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985). Because foreclosure sales are forced sales, the market of foreclosure sales is similar to
the wholesale market. Id.
65. See id. (concluding that reasonable equivalence at foreclosure sale should turn on
foreclosure market value, rather than retail value of property).
66. Id. In Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), the United States Bankruptcy.
Court for the Eastern District of New York noted that a foreclosure market in a city may be
very strong, with foreclosure sales consistently yielding purchase prices of ninety percent of
fair market value. Id. The Adwar court found that another city, however, may have a weak
foreclosure market that regularly yields purchase prices of less than fifty percent of fair market
value. Id. The Adwar court concluded that to apply the Durrett standard in either situation
would be unfair because reasonably equivalent value would not depend on the foreclosure sale
market in each city. Id.
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avoidable foreclosure sales, the Durrett seventy percent standard for deter-
mining whether a foreclosure sale was a fraudulent transfer is patently
unfair.
Finally, the Durrett standard is unsatisfactory because prebankruptcy
protections that affect foreclosure sale prices vary among states. Some
states, for example, offer debtors extra protection by providing them a
statutory redemption period.67 In states that offer debtors additional statu-
tory protection, foreclosure sale purchasers risk losing newly purchased
realty. Consequently, the purchase prices in the states granting a statutory
right of redemption are less than the prices in states where the risks of
purchase are lower.6 s Courts in the states that offer debtors greater protec-
tion, therefore, systematically avoid the greatest number of foreclosure sales
because the purchase prices are more likely to fall below seventy percent of
fair market value. 69
Like the Durrett seventy percent standard, the state foreclosure law
standard of Madrid is an unsatisfactory method for determining whether
the foreclosure sale purchase price is a reasonably equivalent value for the
interest in property transferred. 70 In applying the state foreclosure law
standard of Madrid, courts are responding to policy considerations to which
Congress, not the judiciary, should respond.71 In addition, the Madrid
standard proscribes thorough factual inquiry into the circumstances of each
foreclosure sale and thus prevents courts from determining reasonable
equivalence from an analysis of all the facts of a foreclosure sale.72 Fur-
thermore, courts applying the Madrid state foreclosure law standard do not
67. Id. The statutory right of redemption permits a debtor to cure defaults by repur-
chasing foreclosed property for the foreclosure sale purchase price plus incidental foreclosure
costs. G. NELSON & D. W =tAN, supra note 9, § 7.1. The length of the statutory redemption
period varies from state to state. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 38-38-102, 38-39-102, 38-39-103
(1982)(75 days); MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.3140 (1968)(six months); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 580.23 (West 1947)(12 months); TENN. CODE ANN, § 66-8-102 (1982)(two years).
68. See Zinman, supra note 1, at 1006 n.142 (noting that statutory right of redemption
is "double-edged blade" because it protects debtors from sacrificing equity but also harms
debtors by reducing foreclosure sale purchase prices).
69. Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 113 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985).
70. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismarck v. HuIm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323,
327 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank (In re
Ruebeck), 55 Bankr. 163, 167 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re
re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 114 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985); Hoffman v. Heritage Say. & Loan
Ass'n (In re Garrison), 48 Bankr. 837, 840 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985); Frank v. Berlin (In re
Frank), 39 Bankr. 166, 175 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984).
71. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismarck v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323,
327 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); see infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text
(discussing whether courts should address policy concerns).
72. Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 Bankr. 163, 167 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1985); Frank v. Berlin (In re Frank), 39 Bankr. 166, 175 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); see
infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions imposed by Madrid standard).
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allow trustees to avoid foreclosure sales for price inadequacy, while under
the Bankruptcy Code obtaining less than a reasonably equivalent value at
foreclosure sales is sufficient to avoid a transfer.7 3 Moreover, an implicit
characteristic of the Madrid standard, the good faith requirement, directly
contradicts the intent of Congress to eliminate trustees' proving bad faith
of the parties to fraudulent transfers.74 Additionally, the Madrid state
foreclosure law standard is unfair because the degree of protection in the
context of foreclosure sales varies among states.7 5
In applying the state foreclosure law standard, the Madrid court ap-
parently was responding to policy concerns expressed in Alsop v. Alaska
(In re Alsop). 6 In Alsop, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Alaska noted that permitting trustees to avoid foreclosure sales
would have detrimental effects on the stability of titles purchased at fore-
closure sales, on the participation at foreclosure sales, and on the market-
ability of property at foreclosure sales. 77 Although the Alsop court presented
73. Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. Ill, 113 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985); see infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (comparing grounds for avoiding foreclosure
sale under Bankruptcy Code and state foreclosure law).
74. Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 114 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985); see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (examining erroneous assumption of Madrid
standard).
75. Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 113-14 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1985); see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing differences in state
foreclosure laws).
76. See Alden, Gross & Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Convey-
ance: Proposals for Solving the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus. LAw. 1605, 1613-14 (1983)(suggesting
that Bankruptcy Appellate Panel wanted to avoid decreased participation at foreclosure
sales)[hereinafter Alden]; see also Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop), 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr.
D. Alaska 1981)(noting Durrett's effect of decreased participation at foreclosure sales), aff'd,
22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
77. Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop), 14 Bankr. 982,. 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd,
22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982). Each state has an interest in maintaining the stability of
titles. Accordingly, some states refuse to grant statutory rights of redemption to debtors who
have been subject to foreclosure. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 725a (West Supp. 1983)(state's
legislature recently abolishing right of redemption). Permitting a trustee to avoid a sale as a
fraudulent transfer effectively would be granting the debtor a de facto right of redemption.
Alsop, 14 Bankr. at 987. Stability of titles purchased at foreclosure sales would decrease
because trustees could avoid foreclosure sales for three years after the foreclosure sale.
Goodman, supra note 1, at 280 (noting that trustee may avoid transfer if debtor filed bankruptcy
petition within one year after foreclosure sale and that court has maximum of two years after
debtor files petition in bankruptcy to appoint trustee). The de facto right of redemption,
therefore, is precisely what states are trying to avoid by declining to grant the statutory right
of redemption to the debtor. Id. at 281.
The Alsop court noted that the possibility of a trustee's avoiding a foreclosure sale also
will decrease participation at foreclosure sales. Alsop, 14 Bankr. at 987. Furthermore, the
instability of titles resulting from the possibility of avoidance decreases the marketability of
foreclosure sale transfers. Coppel & Kann, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of
"Transfer," 100 BAsrcniG L.J. 676, 677 (1983)(noting that purchasers are not as willing to
buy property that may be taken from them at some future, indefinite time). With the decreased
participation at foreclosure sales and the decreased marketability of property, the bidding at
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sound policy arguments, Congress, not the judiciary, should address policy
considerations by amending the Bankruptcy Code.
7
The Madrid state foreclosure law standard is also unsatisfactory because
it proscribes thorough factual inquiry into the circumstances surrounding
each transfer.7 9 In applying the Madrid standard, courts do not consider all
relevant facts to determine whether debtors received the highest possible
foreclosure sale price. Instead, courts applying the Madrid state law standard
limit trustees' challenges that debtors received less than a reasonably equiv-
alent value to the 'propriety of the foreclosure proceedings.80 Congress,
however, authorized trustees to avoid transfers for less than a reasonably
equivalent value to permit trustees to maximize the equity of the bankruptcy
estate.81 By refusing to consider the nature of the foreclosed property, the
property's marketability, and the strength of the foreclosure market, courts
often do not maximize the equity in the bankruptcy estate in determining
whether the purchase price was a reasonably equivalent value for the
property transferred.82 By failing to maximize the estate's equity, the Madrid
standard ignores the interests of all creditors in the debtor's assets.83 Thus,
the Madrid state foreclosure law standard fails to advance the objective of
section 548.14
foreclosure sales is less competitive. Alsop, 14 Bankr. at 987. Less competition results in lower
purchase prices and a greater number of deficiency judgments against debtors. See Note, supra
note I, at 278 (explaining results of decreased foreclosure sale participation and decreased
marketability of property). In turn, lower prices detrimentally affect creditors by not maximizing
equity of the debtor's estate. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing Congress'
intent in enacting Bankruptcy Code to protect interests of creditors in bankruptcy estate).
Thus, the decreased participation at foreclosure sales and the instability of titles resulting from
the possibility of avoidance may have influenced the Madrid court to presume reasonable
equivalence.
78. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismarck v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d
323, 327 (8th Cir.)(court must enforce Bankruptcy Code and let Congress address policy
considerations, which cannot affect courts' determining reasonable equivalence), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 990 (1984).
79. See Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 Bankr. 163, 167 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1985)(courts applying Madrid state foreclosure law fail to consider lender's goal at
foreclosure sale of covering unpaid amount of loan and buyer's objectives of paying minimum
price for property at foreclosure sale while obtaining stable title).
80. Frank v. Berlin (In re Frank), 39 Bankr. 166, 175 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984)(challenges
at foreclosure sales include adequacy of notice, duress, and fraudulent or collusive conduct at
foreclosure sale).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see supra note 4 and accompanying text
(discussing Congress' intent in enacting Bankruptcy Code).
82. Compare Zinman, supra note 1, at 1003-06 (foreclosure laws exist to protect
mortgagors and creditor mortgagees) with supra note 4 and accompanying text (intent of
Bankruptcy Code to protect interests of debtor's creditors).
83. See Frank v. Berlin (In re Frank), 39 Bankr. 166, 175 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984)(by
applying state law and failing to avoid foreclosure sale yielding less than reasonably equivalent
value, courts overlook interests of creditors).
84. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining goals of Congress in enacting
Bankruptcy Code to benefit creditors).
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In addition to proscribing factual inquiry in each case, courts applying
the Madrid court's state foreclosure law standard of reasonable equivalence
prevent trustees from avoiding transfers of property for reasons permitted
by section 548.85 Unlike state foreclosure law, section 548(a) permits trustees
to avoid transfers as fraudulent conveyances when debtors receive less than
a reasonably equivalent value for their interests in property., State foreclo-
sure law does not permit trustees to avoid transfers for mere price inade-
quacy.8 Under state law, therefore, trustees can avoid fewer transfers.
Accordingly, although promoting stability of titles through a presumption
of reasonable equivalence, 8 the Madrid state law standard undermines the
Bankruptcy Code's objective of protecting the creditors' interests in the
bankruptcy estate.8 9
Aside from failing to promote the objective of the Bankruptcy Code,
the Madrid state law standard of reasonable equivalence, if applied to
debtors in all states, is inherently unfair to creditors because some states
grant debtors more protection through statutory rights of redemption than
other states. 90 Because foreclosure laws vary among states, 91 courts applying
85. Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 113 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985); see 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(containing Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent
transfer provisions). The fraudulent conveyance provision of section 548(a)(2) authorizes the
debtor to avoid a transfer for price inadequacy. Id. at § 548(a)(2). Courts applying the Madrid
standard do not permit trustees to avoid foreclosure sales simply for price inadequacy when
the state law creates a presumption of reasonably equivalent value. See, e.g., Lawyers Title
Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)(under state
foreclosure law mere inadequacy of price, without fraud, oppression, or unfairness, will not
justify setting aside foreclosure sale), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833
(1984); In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136, 1139 (6th Cir. 1985) (adopting Madrid
court standard that mere inadequacy of price is insufficient to justify avoiding foreclosure
sale), Strauser v. Veterans Admin. (In re Strauser), 40 Bankr. 868, 869-70 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984) (adopting conclusive presumption of reasonable equivalence at regularly conducted foreclosure
sale); and William v. Travelers Ins. Co. (In re William), 39 Bankr. 678, 680 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1984) (inadequacy of price insufficient grounds for challenging regularly conducted foreclosure sale).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
87. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1982)(referring to state law, court held that mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient
justification to avoid foreclosure sale transfer), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 833 (1984).
88. See Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop), 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1981)(disagreeing with Durrett standard because of effect on title stability), aff'd, 22 Bankr.
1017 (D. Alaska 1982). Of all the decisions using the Madrid standard, not one has allowed
an avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance. See, e.g., White v. Luton (In re White), 47 Bankr.
98, 101 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985); Strauser v. Veterans Admin. (In re Strauser), 40 Bankr. 868,
870 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); Reinboldt v. Travelers Ins. Co. (In re Reinboldt), 39 Bankr.
678, 680 (Bankr. D. Mn. 1984).
89. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Bankruptcy Code
to benefit creditors).
90. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing statutory rights of re-
demption).
91. See generally G. NELSON & D. WmTMAN, supra note 9, § 8.1-.8 (discussing generally
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the Madrid standard must ascertain whether the foreclosure sale proceedings
satisfy the foreclosure laws of the forum state. To allow courts to make a
presumption of reasonable equivalence under the Madrid standard when
laws of states vary so much would be unrealistic and unfair. 92
In addition to ignoring differences in state laws, the Madrid standard
contradicts the unambiguous intent of Congress. Courts applying the Madrid
standard to determine reasonable equivalence under section 548 assume that
the parties at foreclosure sales acted in good faith. 93 By assuming the parties'
good faith, however, the Madrid standard contradicts the intent of Congress,
which deleted the good faith test from section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. 94
Congress deleted the good faith requirement because triers of fact incon-
sistently applied the standard to determine foreclosure sale parties' good
faith. 95
Unlike the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's standard in Madrid and the
Fifth Circuit's seventy percent standard in Durrett, the Hulm standard is
acceptable because no one factor is dispositive in courts' determining whether
trustees may avoid foreclosure sales.9 6 In analyzing each case factually,
courts applying the Hulm standard have considered the attendance at the
sale and the participation by bidders attending the sale. 97 The nature of the
protections state statues offer parties to foreclosure); Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative
Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 843
(1980)(comprehensively discussing state law standards that protect parties in mortgage foreclosure
process); Zinman, supra note 1, at 1004-09 (noting court's role and summarizing protections that
courts and statutes afford mortgagors and mortgagees).
92. See Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 114 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1985)(noting inherent unfairness of courts' applying same presumption with such
variance in state laws).
93. Frank v. Berlin (In re Frank), 39 Bankr. 166, 175 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); see
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 9598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2600 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (containing no good faith requirement)).
94. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 9598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2600 (codified
as amended at 11 U.C.S. § 548(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); see supra note 1 (discussing
good faith requirement in § 67(d) of Chandler Act).
95. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing why Congress deleted good
faith requirement of §67(d) of Chandler Act in enacting § 548 of Bankruptcy Code).
96. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (reviewing factors that courts consider
when applying Hulm standard for determining reasonable equivalence).
97. See Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank (In re Ruebeck); 55 Bankr. 163, 168 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1985)(attendance at sale is factor for courts applying Hulm standard to consider
because attendance indicates participation and level of competitive bidding at foreclosure sales);
Hoffman v. Heritage Say. and Loan Ass'n (In re Garrison), 48 Bankr. 837, 840 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1985)(same); see also Washburn, supra note 91, at 888 (for purposes of avoiding
foreclosure sales, state courts consider competitiveness of bidding at foreclosure sale because
level of competition indicates relative fairness of purchase price); Note, The Big Chill:
Applicability of Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code to Noncollusive Foreclosure Sales,
53 FoRDHAm L. Ry. 813, 836 (1985)(high level of participation at foreclosure sales indicates
competitive bidding).
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property98 and the relative marketability of the realty99 are also important
factors. Additionally, courts consider the fair market value of the property
relative to the purchase price at the foreclosure sale.10' By determining
reasonable equivalence on each set of facts, courts applying the case-by-
case analysis benefit creditors and prevent a depletion of the debtors' assets
to the detriment of creditors.10' Furthermore, under the Hulm standard,
unlike the Durrett standard, reasonable equivalence does not depend solely
upon the fair market value of the property. 10 2 Instead, the Hulm position
requires courts to determine reasonable equivalence in light of the facts and
circumstances of each foreclosure sale.'0 3 Thus, courts applying the Hulm
standard fulfill the implications in the use of the term "reasonable" by
examining the relevant facts of each transfer.'04
The Hulm standard is not completely satisfactory, however, because it
does not protect foreclosure sale purchasers. Foreclosure sale purchasers
98. See Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 Bankr. 163, 167 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1985)(in applying Hulm standard, courts consider nature of property as factor
because nature of property affects marketability of property and demand for type of property);
Hoffman v. Heritage Sav. and Loan Ass'n (In re Garrison), 48 Bankr. 837, 840 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1985)(same).
99. See Ruebeck v. Attleboro Say. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 Bankr. 163, 167 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1985)(courts consider relative marketability of property as factor when applying
Hulm standard because foreclosure sale purchase price partly turns on property's marketa-
bility); Hoffman v. Heritage Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Garrison), 48 Bankr. 837, 840 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1985)(same); Note, supra note 97, at 836 (same),
100. Cooper v. Smith (In re Smith), 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982). By
focusing on the disparity between the purchase price and the equity potentially available to
creditors, a court may avoid the foreclosure sale transfer if the unrealized, remaining equity
in the property is much greater than the foreclosure sale price. Id.
101. .Cf. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1982)(court failing to maximize equity of bankruptcy estate by not considering all
facts of foreclosure sale), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
102. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Bismarck v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d
323, 327 (8th Cir.)(evidentiary hearing determines reasonably equivalent value in each case
based on all facts of foreclosure sale), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); see also Ruebeck v.
Attleboro Say. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 Bankr. 163, 167 (Bankr. D. Mass 1985)(determining
reasonable equivalence on case-by-case basis to examine all relevant factors concerning fore-
closure sale purchase price); Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111,
113 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)(conducting factual analysis in each case to determine reasonably
equivalent value); Cooper v. Smith (In re Smith), 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C,
1982)(court examines all facts and circumstances bearing on foreclosure sale to determine
whether debtor received reasonably equivalent value); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones (In re
Jones), 20 Bankr. 988, 994 n.23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)(conducting thorough factual analysis
to determine reasonably equivalent value in each case).
103. See Ruebeck v. Attleboro Sav. Bank (In re Ruebeck), 55 Bankr. 163, 167-68 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1985)(explicitly adopting case-by-case analysis); Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In
re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 114-15 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)(same); DeMusis v. Carr (In re
Carr), 40 Bankr. 1007, 1008 (D. Conn. 1984)(same).
104. See Davis & Standiford, supra note 56, at 230 (term "reasonable" generally implies
that courts investigate facts and circumstances).
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wanting to purchase stable titles cannot determine with any certainty whether
courts, in balancing the facts and circumstances, will avoid a foreclosure
sale as a fraudulent transfer. 0 Thus, the many factors considered by courts
do not provide any certain guidelines for foreclosure sale purchasers.1 6
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit's seventy percent standard in Durrett,
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's state foreclosure law standard in Madrid,
and the Eighth Circuit's evidentiary hearing standard in Hulm, the Ristich
court's conclusive presumption when the purchaser is a third party protects
both debtors and foreclosure sale purchasers. 07 Under Ristich's conclusive
presumption, debtors receive protection through open, competitive bidding
indicated by foreclosure sale purchases by third parties. 0 Thus, purchases
of property interests by third parties would indicate that the purchase price
was the highest possible price in light of the forced nature of the foreclosure
sale. Thus, purchases by third parties would benefit creditors by maximizing
the equity in bankruptcy estates. Because of the presumed competitive
bidding at foreclosure sales where purchasers are third parties, the Ristich
court reasoned that the foreclosure sale purchase price would be the highest
possible price even though a retail market transaction might bring a higher
price.109
In addition to protecting debtors, the Ristich presumption of reasonable
equivalence protects third party purchasers at foreclosure sales. 10 The con-
clusive presumption prevents trustees from avoiding transfers as construc-
tively fraudulent conveyances. Consequently, the presumption of reasonably
equivalent value makes titles purchased by third party purchasers at fore-
closure sales more valuable and certain."' Under the Ristich presumption,
105. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Bismarck v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d
323, 327 (8th Cir.)(noting that evidentiary hearing standard will affect strategies of foreclosure
sale purchasers), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text
(discussing factors that courts consider when applying Hulm standard).
106. But see Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir.
1980)(seventy percent standard provides specific, definite guidelines for purchasers' determining
reasonable equivalent value).
107. In re Ristich, 57 Bankr. 568, 577-78 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); see infra notes 108-
12 and accompanying text (examining how conclusive presumption protects both debtors and
foreclosure sale purchasers).
108. In re Ristich, 57 Bankr. 568, 577 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). At a foreclosure sale, a
creditor will try to preserve its security interest in the property by bidding the amount of
outstanding indebtedness. Alden, supra note 76, at 1619. Because a creditor will insure that
the foreclosure sale purchase price equals or exceeds its security interest, a third party's
purchase price will be the highest possible foreclosure sale purchase price. Id.
109. Ristich, 57 Bankr. at 577-78. The purchase price in a retail sale would be higher
than the foreclosure sale purchase price because the foreclosure sale is a forced sale whereas
the retail sale is an ordinary arms-length transaction. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying
text (explaining differences between foreclosure sale prices and retail sale prices).
110. In re Ristich, 57 Bankr. 568, 577-78 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
111. Id.; see Alden, supra note 76, at 1618 (noting that conclusive presumption gives
foreclosure sale purchaser more certain title to foreclosed property and prevents courts from
transforming purchaser's real estate investment into secured loan by avoiding foreclosure sale).
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third party purchasers would bid for realty at foreclosure sales subject only
to risks normally associated with foreclosure sales." 2 The conclusive pre-
sumption of Ristich, however, does not expose third party purchasers to
the additional risk of trustees' avoiding the foreclosure sale under section
548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Instead of conclusively presuming reasonably equivalent value when
third parties are foreclosure sale purchasers, the Ristich court adopted the
Madrid standard when creditors are foreclosure sale purchasers." 3 Accord-
ingly, the state law of fraudulent conveyance governs whether purchasers
at foreclosure sales paid reasonably equivalent values for property." 4 When
creditors purchase property at foreclosure sales, however, the Ristich posi-
tion does not avoid the problems inherent in the Madrid standard of
determining reasonably equivalent value at foreclosure sales."' The Madrid
standard effectively promotes title stability but fails to fulfill the purpose
of the Bankcruptcy Code because the state foreclosure law standard ignores
the concerns of every creditor." 6 The state foreclosure law standard of
Madrid benefits creditors who purchase at foreclosure sales but ignores the
other creditors' interests in the bankruptcy estate.
The bifurcated approach proposed in Ristich for determining reasonably
equivalent value of property transferred at foreclosure sales is unprece-
dented. Moreover, courts applying a different standard of reasonable equiv-
alence to third party purchases at foreclosure sales than to creditor purchases
at foreclosure sales benefit both foreclosure sale purchasers and trustees.
Foreclosure sale purchasers are searching for the most stable title, while
trustees want to protect creditors' interests in the bankruptcy estate. The
conclusive presumption of Ristich when the purchaser is an independent
third party successfully stabilizes the title transferred at foreclosure sales
while fulfilling the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code." 7 By adopting the
Madrid standard when creditors are the purchasers at foreclosure sales,
112. See Coppel & Kann, supra note 77, at 681 (explaining that risks normally associated
with foreclosure sale purchase are debtor's exercise of statutory right of redemption and
possiblity of other creditors' claims to property).
113. In re Ristich, 57 Bankr. 568, 577 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). The Madrid court
determined reasonable equivalence by referring to state foreclosure law and held that mere
inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set aside a foreclosure sale. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp.
v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
114. In re Ristich, 57 Bankr. 568, 578 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); see supra note 51 and
accompanying text (discussing Illinois foreclosure law standard for determining reasonable
equivalence).
115. See supra notes 70-95 and accompanying text (discussing problems of courts' applying
Madrid state foreclosure law standard).
116. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing consequences to title
stability of courts' applying Madrid state foreclosure law standard).
117. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (explaining that Ristich's presumption
benefits foreclosure sale purchasers and debtors).
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however, the Ristich court ignores creditors' interests in the bankruptcy
estate by not fulfilling the objective of the Bankrupcty Code." 8
The Ristich court could have strengthened its standard for determining
reasonable equivalence when the foreclosure sale purchaser is the creditor
by using Hulm's evidentiary hearing standard." 9 By allowing the trier of
fact to determine reasonably equivalent value for each individual purchase
by the creditor, courts conducting a thorough, factual analysis will benefit
creditors of bankrupt debtors. 20 Even though creditor purchasers could not
invest at foreclosure sales with any certainty of title stability, courts applying
the Hulm standard can fulfill the objective of the Bankruptcy Code by
maximizing the debtor's equity for the benefit of creditors.'2' In contrast,
courts applying the Madrid state foreclosure law standard benefit only
foreclosure sale purchasers and neglect the concerns of the Bankruptcy
Code. i2
The unique distinction between third party purchasers and creditor
purchasers proposed in Ristich is the judiciary's most recent standard for
determining reasonable equivalence at foreclosure sales. 23 The Ristich stand-
ard, when the purchaser is a third party, overcomes the objections to
Durrett's seventy percent standard and to Madrid's state foreclosure law
standard. By adopting Hulm's evidentiary hearing standard, rather than
Madrid's standard, when the foreclosure sale purchaser is the creditor-
mortgagee, a court would determine whether the price received by the debtor
118. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing Ristich's weakness in
using Madrid standard); see also supra notes 79-95 and accompanying text (discussing weak-
nesses of Madrid standard).
119. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Circuit's Hulm
standard); supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (noting that Hulm evidentiary hearing
standard does not protect foreclosure sale purchasers because purchasers cannot determine
whether courts will avoid foreclosure sales as fraudulent transfers).
The bankruptcy court in Ristich was responding to policy considerations expressed in
Goldberg v. Tynan (In re Tynan), a recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. See In re Ristich, 57 Bankr. 567, 576-77 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986)(citing
recent Seventh Circuit decision, Goldberg v. Tynan (In re Tynan), 773 F.2d 177 (1985)).
According to the Ristich court the Seventh Circuit in Tynan opposed the Bankruptcy Code's
interference with foreclosure sales because of the detrimental effect on title stability. See In re
Ristich, 57 Bankr. at 576-77 (Bankr. N.D. II. 1986) (citing recent Seventh Circuit decision,
Goldberg v. Tynan (In re Tynan), 773 F.2d at 179). Because the Seventh Circuit had expressed
concern over the effects that Durrett's standard and Hulm's standard would have on foreclosure
sale participation, the Ristich court felt compelled to follow the rationale of the Tynan court.
In re Ristich, 57 Bankr. at 576-77 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
120. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (discussing how Hulm standard
protects creditors).
121. Id.; see supra note 4 (discussing Congress' purpose to protect creditors' interests in
enacting Bankruptcy Code).
122. See supra notes 70-95 and accompanying text (discussing unsatisfactory characteristics
of Madrid standard); supra note 4 (discussing Congress' intent in enacting Bankruptcy Code
to protect creditors' interests in bankruptcy estate).
123. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing Ristich court's distinction
between third party purchasers and creditor purchasers).
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at a foreclosure sale constituted reasonable equivalence by considering all
the facts and circumstances of the foreclosure market. 124 In enacting section
548, Congress intended to benefit all of the debtor's creditors by authorizing
trustees to recover property transferred for less than reasonably equivalent
value. '5 Thus, courts should determine reasonable equivalence by consid-
ering the interests of all creditors.
DAVID M. ScmLI
124. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text (reviewing factors that courts consider
when applying Hulm standard for determining reasonable equivalence).
125. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress' reason for
enacting § 548 of Bankruptcy Code was to protect creditors).
